Commentary on "Metameric Surfaces: The Ultimate Case Against color Physicalism and Representational Theories of Phenomenal Consciousness" by Zoltan Jakab

Eric Little

SUNY @ Buffalo

Dept of Philosophy

Center for Cog Sci

Mr. Jakab’s paper adequately points out many of the current problems with color physicalism and mental representationalism. His treatment focuses on the correspondence problem inherent in any representationalist theory of a physically perceivable world. Most current representationalist models of consciousness argue that the ontology of color (as well as other physically perceivable phenomena) must eventually be reduced to the treatment of epistemic modes of color perception.

We all wish to hold onto the certainty that color exists in the world, not in our heads. This reverts back to our naïve understanding of the world where we generally seem to learn about and agree upon the facticity of colored objects. If color is in the head, then how do we know that red is the same concept in my head as it is in anyone else’s? Mr. Jakab correctly wishes to account for the external existence of color by claiming that color is not a representation in the head, but is objectively verifiable in the world.

Mr. Jakab is also correct in arguing that color is a contingent rather than necessary phenomenon. Like gravity, it may alternate depending on whether or not we are perceiving it here, on planet Earth, or some other planet or possible world. Color just happens to be so here and now, given the way in which nature is presented to us under normal, earthly conditions.

There are, however, problems with the physicalist account of color, irrespective of the problems of representationalism. Physicalism cannot lend us an adequate phenomenology of color (i.e. any ‘what-it-is-like’ aspect of color perception). One reason for this is that physicalism, no matter how elaborate the system, can only appeal to empirical evidence. Empirical evidence is limited in its phenomenological application since it must automatically assume 1) a theoretically-based ontology of existent things, 2) a testable hypothesis which must at least assume certain pre-given characteristics of said ontology and 3) a method of fact-finding which involves a reduction to physically observable phenomena and solutions (the effect of Ockam’s razor). Empiricism does lend us many insights into the world, but cannot, itself, serve as the basis for any and all phenomenological investigation.

This being said, we can observe an example as follows:

Suppose a subject were to perceive a colored purple field via naked perception. The color of the field is understood by the individual and possibly any other observers as in fact being purple (I refer to Mr. Jakab’s adequate description of color physicalism in terms of surface reflectance).Then suppose I were to lend the subject a pair of powerful spectacles such that anything seen through them was magnified significantly. Now when asked to look at the purple color field again, the subject realizes that the spectacles allow him/her to perceive the solid purple field as actually composed of red and blue dots in close proximity to one another. Which perception then is the real physical color? Were it not for the spectacles, the color would have remained a verifiable purple. After further empirical evidence, however, the subject realizes that they are mistaken. The objective fact is that they are misperceiving purple with the naked senses. This example shows us the problem of granularity in the visual field. Empirical evidence often times shows us that we are mistaken about colors, shapes, seizes, etc.

Yet, phenomenally, it is not a mistake to say with conviction that without the spectacles, one sees purple. Purple after all is a hybrid color formed by two primary colors. Many colors are in fact this way. Yet, we are not often in error when we adequately pick out teal, aqua-marine, khaki, etc. We are simply limited by our biological visual apparatus. We lack the ability to perceive the world as fine-grained as with the spectacles.

We are left with a distinction here which Mr. Jakab must consider. The phenomenal is not altered to any great extent when we discover that microscopically the physical world actually appears differently than to the naked senses. The issue is simply one of the correspondence between one physical world and various phenomenal methods of cutting it up. Purple appears as a genuine fact, even though at a micro-level of investigation it is otherwise. Thus the ontology of perception must be taken into account along with the ontic material it is perceiving. We live in a common sense world full of purple and aqua-marine even though that world is founded on micro-facts where the qualia no longer appear. Thus, some of these qualia emerge from other micro-elements and only appear under mesoscopic, not microscopic considerations.

Mr. Jakab states that "color vision creates the joints for itself when carving up the relevant aspect of nature…The division itself, separated from the properties of observers, is not marked by any objective feature of reality" This being said, he now needs to explain this phenomenon, without the appeal to representationalism which he has adequately done away with. If color is not just an objective feature of reality, then it must be subjective, but in what manner? What allows us the ability to adequately see colors in the world, even though, as my example shows us, they may have several layers of investigation which pertain to them? How is color subjectivism adequately matched up with objective colors in the world if they are not represented? Colors are normally understood "as such," as they are directly perceived and this problem of the subjective understanding of the objective world somewhat resists the strictly empirical explanation which Mr. Jakab hopes for.