PHI 598:  Philosophy of Mind

States of Mind: Emotion, Desire and Belief

Syllabus

 

Prof. Randall  R. Dipert                                                                                     105 Park Hall

Personal Webpage:  http://www.neologic.net/rd                                                   645-2444 ext 105

E-mail:  rdipert@acsu.buffalo.edu                                                                       Office hours:  T 10-11,

                                                                                                                                                W 10-11,  Th 9-10

 

I.  Required Texts for the Course:

            Martha C. Nussbaum, Upheavals of Thought (Cambridge UP August 2001; hardback)

            G.F. Schueler,  Desire  (MIT Press, 1995; paperback)

 

II.  Course Description

Our goal will be to investigate the possibility of a unified theory of all states of mind—what they are, what differentiates them, what kind of “thing” they and their objects or causes are. 

      I will use the language of intentionality, cognitive psychology, and conscious states of mind, but not in a way that blocks the possibility of further reduction.  (At the same time, I will not take it as a plank of the credo of modernism that it is obviously reducible.)  The difficulty in developing such a theory is to account for (a) phenomenal components (the “feel” of an emotion or a desire), (b) the prepositional or conceptual objects that are associated with it (e.g., the target of anger, the proposition that is believed), and (c) the mechanisms which govern the state’s formation (e.g., requisite previous and “causing” cognitive states for anger) as well as (d) subsequently caused states of the world and mind (intentions, increased blood pressure and anxiety, changes in other states of mind, even actions).  Presumably the differences among families of states of mind has something to do with how they “function” in the rest of our mental life and behavior (functionalism in the philosophy of mind).  But is fulfilling a certain function necessary for having a certain kind of mental state?  Sufficient?  Both? Neither?

      Lurking in the background is also the question of whether such states of mind are needed properly to explain behavior (whether they are dismissible “folk psychology”: Steven Stich), whether their differentiation is cultural or linguistic (indeed, whether some states of mind only exist in some cultures), and of the morality of these states of mind.  Are there some states of mind, even without subsequent actions, that are just wrong to have or feel?  Are all mental states (or sequences of mental states) “willable” or trainable, and hence we are responsible for them?

Cheryl Misak’s Colloquium talk last Fall Semester [Nov 29 (Th)  Cheryl Misak (University of Toronto) “Belief” 141 Park Hall  4 p.m] was an initiation into some of the issues.  We will have guest lecturers in spring 2002 talking about emotions (Ronald de Sousa, U. Toronto; D. Pollock, UB, Anthropology), about different emotional language and conceptualization in other cultures and, a real barnburner, the instructor will give an open lecture on “The Phenomenology of Sexual Desire: Lust and Its Objects.”

 

III.  Course Requirements

 

1.  Reading quizzes, approximately every 3 weeks, announced 1 week in advance,

     30 minutes.  Notes, books, and articles permitted.                                             30%

2.  Two short papers, 3-5 pp.                                                                                30%

3.  One longer paper  [Due 5 pm the last day of classes, April 30.]                         40%

 

Nota bene: No late papers!  Up to one week after the due date, you will receive one grade lower than you would have received had your paper been on time.  After one week past the due date, the paper will NOT be accepted and you will receive a zero.

                                     

 

 

 

IV. Initial Assignments:

 

22 Jan  T          1          First class—“Hard and easy problems in phil. of mind and phil. psychology”

29 Jan T          2          Emotions 1       Reading:           Dipert, “The Nature and Structure of Emotions”

                                                                                    A. Rorty, “Explaining Emotions”

5 Feb   T          3          Emotions 2       Reading:           Nussbaum: Upheavals of Thought 

                                                                                        Pt I Sec. 1, “Emotions as Judgments…”pp. 1-88

12 Feb T          4          NO CLASS

19 Feb T          5          Emotions 3:      Reading:           Nussbaum: Upheavals of Thought  I.2 (all);
                                    Reading Quiz.                               I.3.v; I.4: i,iii,iv,vii; 
                                                                                        Recommended:  All other chapters in Pt. I. 

26 Feb T          6          Emotions 4:      Reading:           Nussbaum:  II.6 (all); II, 7 (all); Rec.: II, 8.

                                                                                    SHORT PAPER 1 due:  Emotions

5 Mar   T          7          Emotions 5:     Reading:            Nussbaum:  III, 9 (all);  III. 16.vi-viii

                                                                                        Rec.: III.10,11,12,13,14,15,16. I-v.

12 Mar T          8          Emotions 6:     Misc. Topics in emotion.  Reading TBA.

 

IV. Relevant Readings

 

Robert Audi, The Architecture of Reason: The Substance and Substructure of Rationality (Oxford UP 2001), especially sections on desire.

J.R. Averill, Anger and Aggression: An Essay on Emotion (Springer 1982).  Psychology.

Lynn Rudder Baker, Explaining Attitudes : A Practical Approach to the Mind (Cambridge University Press, 1995).

------------------------,  Saving Belief: A Critique of Physicalism (Princeton UP, 1987).

Akeel Bilgrami, Belief and Meaning : The Unity and Locality of Mental Content (Blackwell, 1992).

Simon Blackburn, Ruling Passions (Clarendon Oxford UP, 1998)

Michael Bratman, “Practical Reasoning and Acceptance in a Context,” Mind 1992 (101[401]), pp. 1-15.

Chesire Calhoun and Robert C. Solomon, What is as Emotion?  Classic Readings in Philosophical Psychology (Oxford UP 1984).

René Descartes,  The Passions of the Soul trans. S.H. Voss (Hackett, 1989)

Craig DeLancey, Passionate Engines; What Emotions Reveal about Mind and Artificial Intelligence (Oxford UP, 2002).

Antonio Dimasio, Descartes’ Error: Emotion, Reason, and the Human Brain  (1994)

R.M. Gordon, The Structure of Emotions: Investigations in Cognitive Psychology (Cambridge UP 1987).

Paul E. Griffiths, What Emotions Really Are (U. Chi. Press, 1997).

Rom Harré (ed.), The Social Construction of the Emotions (Blackwells, 1986).

Anthony Kenny, The Metaphysics of Mind (Oxford UP 1992), esp Ch. 4 “Emotion.”

Justin Oakley, Morality and the Emotions (Routledge 1992)

Amélie Rorty (ed.), Explaining Emotions (U. Cal. P, 1980)

Amélie Rorty, Mind in Action: Essays in the Philosophy of Mind (Beacon Press, Boston: 1988).

Lynne Rudder Baker, Saving Belief: A Critique of Physicalism (Princeton UP, 1987)

Jean-Paul Sartre, The Emotions: Outline of a Theory.

Israel Scheffler, In Praise of the Cognitive Emotions (Routledge, 1991)

Roger Scruton, Sexual Desire: A Moral Philosophy of the Erotic (NY Free Press, 1986)

Max Scheler, Grammatik der Gefühle: Das Emotionale als Grundlagen der Ethik (DTV, 2000)

Robert Solomon, The Passions: The Myth and Nature of Human Emotion (University of Notre Dame Press, 1976, Hackett 1993)

Ronald de Sousa, The Rationality of Emotion (MIT, 1987).

J. David Velleman, The Possibility of Practical Reason (Clarendon Ox UP, 2000) especially on desire and belief.

R. Jay Wallace, Responsibility and the Moral Sentiments (Harvard UP 1994).

Richard Wollheim, On the Emotions (Yale UP, 1999).